The full-scale war has become not only a test for Ukraine but also an environment for the rapid accumulation of unique experience — from tactical medicine to military innovation. Today, this experience is being closely studied around the world in an effort to understand how it is reshaping the nature of modern warfare and what implications it may have for future defense systems.
In a conversation with Leadership Daily, Fedir Serdiuk— a Ukrainian entrepreneur, founder of humanitarian, medical, and defense initiatives, and co-founder of FAST and MOWA Defense, as well as the humanitarian organization PULSE — explains why Ukraine’s experience is still too early to be considered the foundation of a new global industry, how the role of medicine on the battlefield is transforming, and which lessons of this war the world risks overlooking.
Leadership Daily: Ukraine has gained unique experience in the context of a full-scale war. In your view, could this experience — particularly in tactical medicine and military innovation — become the foundation for a new global industry? If so, who would drive it: the state, the private sector, or international alliances?
F. Serdiuk: In my opinion, there are currently no grounds to speak about the emergence of a new global industry. The development of the capabilities of Ukraine’s Defense Forces in 2022–2026, as well as those of Russia and their respective allies, is certainly a major driver in the evolution of military thinking in general and the defense-industrial complex (DIC) in particular — but it does not constitute a new industry.
The argument here is quite straightforward. According to Forbes Ukraine, Ukraine’s defense-industrial complex in 2025 is estimated to have a production capacity of around $50 billion. By comparison, the U.S. defense-industrial complex generated nearly $1 trillion in sales in 2024 (in terms of revenue, not capacity).
Our confrontation with Russia has clearly changed the nature of warfare on the battlefield and has likely laid the groundwork for how future conflicts will be fought. We — Ukrainian military personnel, manufacturers, and contractors — have undeniably set trends in the development of new products and are shaping requirements in certain categories, such as unmanned platforms. However, we are still far from having a transformative impact on the global industry.
Nevertheless, the influence of Ukrainian military projects on the defense-industrial capabilities of other countries is growing. All the actors you mentioned are contributing to this process, each with their own role. The state (the military) employs weapons, the private sector manufactures and supports, and partners provide funding and, for example, technological assistance.
Leadership Daily: Ukraine is often described today as a “living laboratory of modern warfare.” Do you agree with this definition — and where is the ethical boundary of such an approach? What key lessons from this “laboratory” does the world risk overlooking?
F. Serdiuk: I’m not sure about the “laboratory” framing, but in our fight for freedom there are indeed many tactical and technical solutions being applied either for the first time or in ways different from before. These are essentially hypotheses: what if, for example, ammunition is delivered to frontline positions not by a vehicle with a driver, but by a remotely operated ground platform?
For some, this is a matter of combat operations and survival; for others, it may look like experimentation or part of R&D.
As for lessons, different countries have varying levels of access to our experience and different appetites for studying it. Argentina, Bahrain, and the Netherlands all operate within very different defense contexts. So who adopts what — both literally and figuratively — will become clear over time. Churchill is often (perhaps incorrectly) credited with saying that generals always prepare for the last war. Missing the shift is an international military pastime.
Leadership Daily: Tactical medicine in Ukraine has evolved from a volunteer-driven initiativeinto a systemic element of national defense. What was the turning point when it became clear this was no longer a chaotic movement but an emerging institution? And which management decisions proved critical at that stage?
F. Serdiuk: On May 5, 2026, it will be 12 years since I began observing this field, so my perspective may be somewhat subjective. If we speak specifically about tactical medicine (rather than military medicine as a whole), the key turning points were:
- the first TCCC training (April–May 2014) and the introduction of the first windlass tourniquet;
- the Ministry of Defense training standard I-ST-3 (2014–2015);
- the establishment of the 205th Tactical Medicine Training Center, now the School of Tactical Medicine (with a major contribution from Hero of Ukraine Yevhen Khrapko) — this was the real inflection point;
- the mass training of personnel in 2022–2023;
- the update of basic military training standards in 2025;
- the 2026 military medical doctrine, which finally institutionalizes TCCC.
Leadership Daily: Drones have radically changed the dynamics of the battlefield — its speed, distance, and the nature of injuries. How should military medicine transform in response to these changes? What competencies and technologies will become essential for future medics?
F. Serdiuk: I would say the key shift is that saving a wounded person’s life now requires not only medical knowledge and a basic understanding of tactics and logistics. Effective operations on the frontline now also demand expertise in planning, command and control, communications, integration of unmanned systems, situational awareness, and more.
In many armies, medicine is viewed either as part of J-4 — logistics — or as a separate “entity” that exists on its own. Now it is clear that medicine has merged into the conduct of warfare, with medical functions distributed across battle functions.
In other words, to save lives, you need the same capabilities as for fighting: command and control, intelligence, supply, and even firepower (in the context of delivering payloads).
Leadership Daily: Ukraine’s experience is attracting significant interest from NATO countries. Which elements are truly universal and scalable, and which are deeply contextual and not directly transferable? Where is the line between “exporting knowledge” and the need for local adaptation?
F. Serdiuk: Every army is like a train running on its own tracks. One of NATO’s core ideas is interoperability — the ability of member states to operate effectively together. This involves many layers of integration — from shared ammunition calibers (such as 5.56 rifle rounds) to standardized approaches to operational planning and logistics.
Any know-how has to be “translated” into the language of the end user and adapted to their “tracks.” I don’t see major problems with this, except for two key issues:
- In countries where traditional defense industries (such as tank manufacturers) have significant influence, it is naturally more difficult to integrate drones into doctrine — even though in our context they are the primary means of engagement. Lobbying exists, and it must be taken into account.
- Certain practices that are considered normal in the Ukrainian military are unacceptable in many Western armies. For example, the need to assemble munitions using residual explosives and improvised initiator-detonators.
Leadership Daily: In conditions of high uncertainty, traditional planning models often fail. How do you build a strategic decision-making process when you don’t have complete information and there is no room for error? Do you have internal principles or “rules” that help you maintain clarity of thought?
F. Serdiuk: In recent years, most decisions have been fairly obvious and haven’t involved major dilemmas. In fact, I’ve never really had the experience of working with complete information. I rely on a circle of people I trust and consult with.
Leadership Daily: From your perspective, what does Europe still underestimate or misunderstand about modern warfare? Which illusions are the most dangerous — and what consequences could they lead to?
F. Serdiuk: I think they don’t fully grasp how close the war could come to them. Nor do they understand the opportunities that the technological know-how emerging from this war could create, for example, for terrorism or crime. They cannot fully comprehend the scale of resource consumption in a full-scale war — ammunition, blood, explosives, transport, and so on. They also underestimate how “viral” the concept of drone warfare could become among less economically developed but ambitious countries.
Time will show the consequences.
Leadership Daily: Which technologies are overestimated today, and which are, on the contrary, underestimated in the military context?
F. Serdiuk: Each domain has its own — war is a vast field where every segment has its own technologies. Overestimated are most medical developments, including complex training simulators, integrated tourniquets, “innovative” bandages, and hemostatic agents. There is neither real demand nor a viable market for them. The majority of AI-based solutions — including drone swarms — are also overestimated, at least for now. Largely, it’s hype. Gun systems and sights for machine guns designed to counter UAVs — no comment.
Underestimated are ballistic missiles and, by an order of magnitude, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).
Leadership Daily: Looking 5–10 years ahead, what will “battlefield medicine of the future” look like? Which elements of today’s experience will become standard, and which will disappear?
F. Serdiuk: I hope the need to treat soldiers will disappear altogether. Whether that’s because we live in peace or because robots fight instead of humans — we’ll see.
